The Wind Point sell-side lens — what reaches the owner: normalized earnings, the equity bridge, deleveraging, and what blocks a clean sale.
At a 14× exit, run-rate EBITDA of $74.42M frames an $1.8B enterprise value and $1.2B of proceeds — a 2.3× MOIC. The $20.510000000000005M run-rate-vs-reported gap is worth $287.1400000000001M of EV, so make the QoE bridge diligence-proof and clear the Normalized run-rate EBITDA defensible block before the dataroom opens.
4 of 4 headline metrics improving vs prior · still off target: EBITDA $1.85B vs $2.00B, Net Debt/EBITDA 0.1x vs 0.0x, Free Cash Flow $1.53B vs $1.60B
Move to credit hold pending paydown; reforecast ARR net of likely churn.
Distress filings + overdue AR; churn risk High on $6.4M account.
Sets deal capacity and refinancing risk.
A buyer underwrites run-rate, not reported — at 14× that $20.510000000000005M gap is worth $287.1400000000001M of enterprise value.
The lowest-% dataroom item is the top exit risk: Bridge built; unbanked synergy needs support.
The cockpit is strong day-to-day — but this is the exit lens. It cuts through to what an exit actually turns on: debt, normalized earnings, the equity proceeds that reach Wind Point, and the diligence items that block a clean sale. At a 14× exit, run-rate EBITDA of $74.42Mand $298.86M of gross debt frame the whole conversation.
Reported → add-backs → Adjusted → unbanked synergy → annualize → leakage → Run-rate normalized.
So what: a buyer underwrites run-rate, not reported — the gap is $20.510000000000005M of EBITDA. At the 14× exit multiple that gap is worth $287.1400000000001M of enterprise value, which is exactly why the QoE bridge has to be defensible.
Exit EV → less net debt → less fees → Equity value → less mgmt rollover → Proceeds to Wind Point.
MOIC: against an assumed $520M of invested equity, $1.2B of proceeds is a 2.3× MOIC. Net debt and fees take $273.65999999999985M off the top; management rollover takes the rest of the gap to gross EV — the bridge is what turns a headline multiple into real cash to the fund.
Quarterly FCF sweep pays down the term loan; EBITDA growth does the rest. Covenant is 5.5×.
| Period | Beg debt | FCF sweep | End debt | EBITDA | Leverage | Kind |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Q2 FY26 (act) | $295.92M | −$10.55M | $285.38M | $67.97M | 4.20× | Actual |
| Q3 FY26 | $285.38M | −$9.38M | $276M | $71.49M | 3.86× | Forecast |
| Q4 FY26 | $276M | −$12.31M | $263.7M | $75.59M | 3.49× | Forecast |
| Q1 FY27 | $263.7M | −$9.96M | $253.73M | $79.69M | 3.18× | Forecast |
| Q2 FY27 | $253.73M | −$11.13M | $242.6M | $83.8M | 2.90× | Forecast |
| Exit FY27 | $242.6M | −$12.89M | $229.71M | $87.9M | 2.61× | Forecast |
First-lien term loan dominates; revolver headroom and seller notes round out the structure.
| Tranche | Kind | Balance | Rate | Maturity | Note |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| First-lien Term Loan B | Term | $243.19M | SOFR + 475 (≈9.6%) | 2028-06 | Covenant-lite; springing leverage 5.5x on revolver draw. |
| Revolving credit facility | Revolver | $35.16M | SOFR + 400 | 2027-06 | $150M facility; $90M undrawn = liquidity. |
| Seller notes / earnouts | Seller | $12.89M | 6.0% fixed | 2026-2027 | Deferred consideration on RFI/ECD tied to synergy capture. |
| Finance leases (fleet/RE) | Lease | $7.62M | ≈7% | rolling | Fleet + office leases. |
Net revenue retention dips at year 1 on integration, then recovers on platform cross-sell.
| Cohort | Acquired | NRR at acq | NRR yr 1 (dip) | NRR now | Yr-1 churn | Note |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nippon Large Cap Fund | 2021 | 98% | 95% | 111% | 9% | Integrated; cross-sell drove recovery above 110. |
| Nippon Tax Saver Fund | 2021 | 97% | 96% | 109% | 8% | Stable base; ITM attach lifted expansion. |
| Nippon Hybrid Fund | 2022 | 99% | 94% | 108% | 11% | Early dip on rebranding; now expanding. |
| Equity Portfolio: Hybrid Fund | 2023 | 96% | 92% | 103% | 12% | Mid-recovery; ERP cutover disruption tail. |
| Debt Portfolio: Hybrid Fund | 2024 | 95% | 90% | 96% | 14% | In the trough — integration churn not yet offset. |
| Nippon Wealth Management | 2024 | 94% | 91% | 95% | 13% | Earliest; watch the base through cutover. |
Integration dips the base in year one, then platform cross-sell recovers it above 105 — except ISC and Signet, still in the trough and the one soft spot a buyer will probe in the recurring-revenue pack.
The top exit risk is the lowest-% item — Normalized run-rate EBITDA defensible (70%): Bridge built; unbanked synergy needs support.